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Shluh MW11

[For information on Shluh confederations (and super-confederations), made up of a number of neighboring tribes, see category 631.]

/41 cont./

342 184 or lost in a group, in the plains, on the Dir; or in the mountains, in a region of difficult access or, on the contrary, on the course of a natural route /42/ of penetration. The social and political [642] state of the tribe also makes its influence felt by imposing a great simplicity on the exterior appearance in the regions where republican institutions exist, while in the country of temporal leaders a taste for decoration and ornamentation develops. Nevertheless, in order to simplify, one can be content with essential distinctions and contrast the plains house to that of the mountains.

On the plains, in the Sous valley, in the land of the Chtouka and Haha, a type of one-story house predominates, made up of chambers that open onto the interior of a square enclosure. Exterior protection is usually ensured by a wall of beaten earth [789] built with a rammer inside a wooden form (1);

1. Because of this construction process by means of a form made of boards (louh), the name of "louh" is often given to the wall itself.

the lower part of the wall is often made of stone, for it gives a better foundation for the whole, and, moreover, the work of thieves who pierce the walls at night is rendered more difficult; in some regions the wall is replaced by a hedge of jujube-tree thorns that exceeds two meters in height, while one or two watchtowers constructed at angles permit keeping watch; at the corners of the wall old pots overturned and bovid skulls ward off the evil eye and chase bad influences far away.

The flocks are kept in the central courtyard, onto which open [231] the various separate rooms of the house; in the middle of one side [414] of the enclosure, a heavy door, closed by a wooden lock, flanked by wide masonry pillars, protects the entrance. This door opens into a low room used both as vestibule and storehouse. When the sons are married, each room is occupied by a [592] household.

/137 cont./

114 The authority of the more or less independent "amghars" ap-
*634 peared to him then to be predominant, but without going so far
*631 as to suppress the existence of the assemblies, for the chiefs'
-642 authority must be used lightly in order to exist. "Tribes, dis-
619 tricts, villages," he tells us, "live, some under a despotic re-
gime, others under a democratic regime. The first are governed by families in which supreme power with the title of sheik is hereditary: such are the Aït Amer, the Zenaga, the Mezgita. The authority of these sheiks is not burdensome for their subjects; more or less close relatives of a large number of them, it is necessary for them to treat these /188/ natural allies tactfully. Besides, it is to their interest not to offend anyone; they allow those under their jurisdiction great freedom and ask of them only three things: to pay a trifling tax, to follow them when they wage war, not to fight, pillage, or steal too much among themselves; this is permitted only with strangers. As for the rest, complete license" ... Such is what de Foucauld calls the "despotic regime." "As for the democratic regime, the tribes or districts that have
[184] adopted it possess it with the most diverse nuances. Among some, such as the Ilalen, the Iberqaqen, the system established in the North prevails; fractions, tribes, villages are governed by the assembly of all their members. Elsewhere, as in the qsars of Tisint, of Tatta, the assembly keeps sovereign power in its hands and entrusts the executive power to a sheik whom it elects; sometimes it ceaselessly carries it from the one to the other. Certain tribes, such as the Ida Ou Blal, the Aït Ou Mribet, the Isaffen, are divided into fractions, each having at its head a family in which the dignity of sheik is hereditary. Sometimes the power of these chiefs is quite great, as among the Aït Ou Mribet and Isaffen; sometimes, as among the Ida Ou Blal, their only prerogative is to lead their brothers in combat" (1).

1. De Foucauld, Reconnaissance au Maroc /Reconnaissance in Morocco/, pp. 91-92.

/141 cont./

*631 Nevertheless, between these two opposed political regimes,
648 -- the government of the Berbère /Berber/ assemblies and the Makhzen /makhzan/ -- intermediate forms were often born in the least accessible parts of the country in the mountains, the very ones that could, thanks to their distance, escape the too-brutal consequences of the furious struggle between two naturally hostile forces. One then saw emerge the minor chiefs who tried to assemble all the forces of the country remaining free, in order to pit them one last time against the feared domination of the Makhzen. Nearly always, it is true, these champions of independence betrayed the cause that they claimed to serve. Having become masters of tribes, they were able, at the favorable moment, to hurry along an evolution henceforth inevitable and made themselves agents of the central power.

*631 We can indicate the successive stages of the political evolution from then on.

• [642] In all the regions screened by distance or difficulty of communications from the direct action of the kaids of the Makhzen /makhzan/, the democratic or oligarchic republican organization is here, as in all North Africa, the form of government spontaneously chosen by the Berbère /Berber/ communites; still the power of tradition is not so great that one does not see appear sometimes, by means of struggles of families, a still precarious and ephemeral personal power.

*634 When circumstances are favorable, the "amghar" who has succeeded in elevating himself above the notables of his small canton manages to consolidate what de Foucauld happily called "a despotic power." Most often it is by means of war that the chief thus rising increases his power, just as it is by the assassination of his rivals that he founded it. He soon succeeds in constituting in the middle of republican tribes a veritable little state that he governs as he pleases. Two roads then present themselves
[648] to the victorious amghar; he can remain /142/ the champion of Berbère /Berber/ independence and extend further, by an adroit protectorate, his influence over the neighboring republics;

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*634 *631 177 resistance modify here or there the country's pace of transformation. The geographical situation, bravery in war, or the intelligence of the inhabitants can also change, according to regions, the fate of the tribes. Actually, this small Berbère /Berber/ world does not appear to us in the same aspects in all places. On the contrary, there is no region /143/ that would be more varied, less homogeneous. Thus, in a group of high valleys where the oligarchic regime is preponderant, the assemblies are not all made up in an identical way, the representation of the families is not the same everywhere. Sometimes "the word," the command, is reserved for a few privileged villages; elsewhere we discern the appearance of a little senate, which little by little ousts the heads of the other families and slowly prepares the establishment of personal power. Likewise, when the little states of the summits, formerly independent, live under the protection of an amghar who has established his dominion over several nearby cantons, the chief's authority squares in a variable manner with that of the notables of the country, whom we sometimes see reduced to powerlessness, or, on the contrary, kept along with their "moqaddem," as if they were still valuable auxiliaries for the new master. These frequent differences between the small local constitutions have great importance; it is through them that is best manifested the originality, one might say the personality, of all the small social organisms, whose number, limits, and importance we shall soon indicate. They remind us, moreover, of the living flexibility and the diversity of an evolution that we would be tempted to explain by too-simple laws.

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*631 178 177 642 It remains no less certain that the great political-regime transformations reach at the same time entire regions that evolve toward personal power, unite in resistance, or, on the contrary, succumb in large masses to the pressure of the Makhzen /makhzan/. It is the existence of these general movements that justifies, in spite of local differences, the simplification that we shall try to establish by explaining all the evolution of the Moroccan South by the transition of the republican regime to that of the despotic

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amghars, then to that of the great Berbère /Berber/ chiefs of the mountains, and finally to effective domination by the Makhzen.

In order to study the republican institutions, it will suffice for us to describe the former state of the western Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/, calling upon the still-precise memories of the old men and observing the social state that has been preserved in the most secluded mountain valleys; it is in this region, to which one could give the name of "Kabylie du Haut-Atlas" /Kabylia of the High Atlas/, that it will be easiest for us to find again the most highly developed form of Berbère /Berber/ government, that of the /144/ assemblies of notables, presided over by a "moqaddem" named for one year. The Sous plain, before its submission to the Makhzen, the Sirwa, the region of the Dadès, of the Todgha and the valleys of the Atlas that descend there offer us analogous examples of oligarchic organization. On the other hand, the region of the Ida Ou Tanan, the mountains of the western Anti-Atlas, with their more egalitarian constitutions, are more attached to a democratic organization. We can then [121] easily show, by a rapid comparison with other groups of the Jbala, of the Senhaja of Srair, of the Rif, and of the Kabylie /Kabylia/, how the south of Morocco possesses, in spite of present appearances, a profound similarity of structure with the other regions of North Africa peopled by sedentary Berbères /Berbers/ remaining faithful to their secular traditions.

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It is still the same region of the western Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/, confined between the Nefis wadi and the Bibaoun pass, that appears to us to be the most favorable place for examining how the power of the amghars rises in the heart of these small republics. Similar in origin to those who appear in all the other Berbère /Berber/ tribes, we shall see these minor chiefs grow in importance here little by little, by means of the war, while depending on the territorial alliances that take the name of "leff."

Soon the development of the amghars' power will lead us to study the establishment of the regime of the great kaids. The chiefs of Tagontaft present the most perfect picture of this political organization, while those of Telwet and Bouaboud,

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121 by their origins, belong more to the tradition of the Makhzen
*631 /makhzan/.

*634 Finally, the tribes of the two versants of the Atlas, in the
land of the Haha, the interior plain of the Sous and of the
121 Chtouka, will give us good examples of definitive submission to
*631 the Sultan. The undertakings of ʿAbdallah ou Bihi in the mid-
648 dle of the nineteenth century, and, nearer to us, those of the Glawa, will help us to understand the last phase of the transformation of the tribes. It is only then, as we shall see, that all the former cadres are broken; having arrived at this degree of submission, the Berbère /Berber/ country has the same regime of government as the great plains of the North peopled by Arabs, dominated by kaids, caliphates, or sheiks, themselves delivered up to the caprices of the Makhzen. The Sultan's absolute power is thrust upon all; but this despotic Makhzen itself remains threatened by internal anarchy; it struggles desperately, until /145/ the establishment of our Protectorate, against the incessant revolts that break out on all the confines of the Empire.

121 VIII. The political transformation of the Sous, image of that
*631 of Berbérie /Barbary/. -- Our ignorance of the history of the internal life of the tribes does not permit us to study the evolution of the Moroccan South over a long period. We shall scarcely succeed in following it during the course of the events that have disturbed the Sous for three generations. But in this brief interval of
• [642] [598] time we are going to see the obstinate will of the Berbères /Berbers/, whose ideal is to realize, by their constitutions, the chimera of the equitable sharing of the advantages of power, to clash with the unbridled ambition of the amghars and kaids.

*631 The transformation that results from this struggle and is ac-
178 complished in less than a century, according to the same rules,
121 at different points of a vast province, is not, we now know, the first that the Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/ has undergone. Other chiefs, as we have seen, rose and grew in importance in this same country at the times of the Almohades and Mérinides; if we cannot know the conditions under which their power took

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*631 121 [178] shape and disappeared, one may believe that the play of social forces, remaining so similar in themselves in the course of centuries, was exercised formerly in the same form as today.

One might go further and seek out in other provinces of the Sherifian Empire, now subject to the Sultan's authority, the traces of an evolution similar to the one that the South of Morocco underwent several times. In a still more general way, the *631 121 171 Mussulman history of North Africa as a whole gives us the spectacle of attempts, ephemeral for the most part, undertaken by ambitious men to found a personal power analogous to that of the Berbère /Berber/ amghars and kaids of the Sous. By force of arms, or thanks to the support of religion, they build small states, assemble around themselves a group of tribes, and found dynasties that try for two or three generations to retain in a centralized organization the peoples that they have subjected to their authority.

But the conditions under which these principalities are constituted in a land remaining on the whole faithful to republican institutions most often remain obscure. Perhaps /146/ we shall succeed, in the light of this study made on a still-living past, in illuminating some of the hidden rules that explain their rise, their life, and their disappearance.

*631 121 178 •642 *634 The example of the South of Morocco will show us how the fragile cadres of the little Berbère /Berber/ states can be broken up in order to constitute a larger political organism to which one can almost already give the name of kingdom; we shall also see in what way these cantons, formerly autonomous, soon recover, thanks to revolts, their early liberty and return to, along with their egalitarian dreams, their primitive institutions. Thus the cycle of evolution of the Sous tribes, which has its origin in organized anarchy in order to arrive at the ruinous despotism of the Makhzen /makhzan/ and does not delay in coming back to its point of departure, thanks to the confusion of the sibas, will for us be no more than the most humble aspect, the elementary form of another rhythm: that of the rise, development, and ruin of Mussulman empires, whose regular seesawing suffices to fill all the history of the Maghreb with a tireless monotony.

*631 [174] /168 cont./ conclusions of our research on the origin of the leffs will soon come, as a matter of fact, to confirm it and increase its value.

X. The factitious confederations. -- The confederations that we have just studied still form in our day the most ancient historic groups of the Masmouda.

The Ida Ou Tanan give us a different and unique example in the South of Morocco: that of a recent and factitious confederation, but whose organization satisfies permanent necessities and which has existed for several centuries (3).

[175] [619] 3. Alone among the historians and geographers, Ibn Khaldoun /ibn-Khaldun/ mentions the name of the Ida Ou Tanan, without its apparently being applied to this region. The "Youtanan" appear to him as one of the subdivisions of the Mesfiwa, belonging to the tribe of Assaden of the Masmouda, Histoire des Berbères /History of the Berbers/, Vol. II, p. 160.

*631 175 [648] [792] [642] At the time that the penetration of the Makhzen /makhzan/, which was being carried out /map appears here/ /169/ through the south of the Haha and the Sous plain, was going to endanger the independent fractions of the extreme tip of the western Atlas, a marabout, Sidi Brahim ou ʿAli, disciple of Sidi Saʿid Ou ʿAbd en Naʿim, according to the local tradition, was able to give the Berbères /Berbers/ the constitution that was going to permit them to found a small state locked in the isolation of the mountains and high plateaus near the Atlantic. Three tribes, with equal rights, and doubtless equal in strength at the beginning, make up the confederation. They are the Aït Tinkert, the Aït Ouʿazzoun, the Ifesfasen, who, however, in our time live under different political regimes and regulate their internal affairs as they think fit. But twice a year, during the "mousem" /festival/ of the patron saint of the country, each tribe delegates representatives in equal number, who settle according to a fixed ceremonial and by common accord "under the wild olive tree" of Sidi Brahim ou

*631 619 [796] [692]

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Book III

The Rise and the Development of Personal Power

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First Chapter

The Rise of Personal Power; the Amghar, Canton Chief

I. General conditions for the rise of personal power. -- II. The struggle of the soffs and the appearance of the amghar. -- III. The first financial resources of the chief. -- IV. The beginnings of the amghar of Tagontaft (1850-1860). -- V. The amghar El Hajj Hafid of the Idma (1905-1925). -- VI. The amghars of the Ida ou Zeddagh (1840-1925). -- VII. The government of the canton by the amghar. -- VIII. The amghars and the policy of the leffs. -- IX. The amghars grow more important apart from the Makhzen. -- X. The minor chiefs of the Ida ou Tanan. -- XI. The minor chiefs of the oases of the South. -- XII. The amghars of the Rif. -- XIII. The chiefs of the Kabylie /Kabylia/.

*634 642 661 I. General conditions for the rise of personal power. -- To divide equitably the benefits of power among the family heads, and in order to succeed at it, to exercise an anxious surveillance over the ambitious ones, such is the constant concern that dominates the whole internal policy of the little Berbère /Berber/ republics. But whatever the vigilance of the councils of notables, one always sees men appear in whom the taste for honors, money, or power makes them find the cadre in which tradition intends to enclose them too narrow. In all the tribes, even where oligarchic or democratic institutions are most completely accepted, chiefs rise for a time above the assemblies, seize authority, and try, in taking the title of amghar, to found by violence what de Foucauld rightly called despotic power.

Most often the results of these attempts are ephemeral. The regime of tyranny inaugurated by the amghar does not survive him, and immediately after his death the reaction of 642 the small oligarchies or the masses carries away his work. At *634 other times, too, local circumstances are favorable for the 198

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• 642 appearance of personal power; a family in a high valley succeeds
* 634 in consolidating the /270/ precarious organization that has
178 created, to its advantage, a successful leader; one then sees for two or three generations the activity of the councils of "inflas" weaken or disappear and the struggle of the rival "ikhs" stop; the social life itself changes, and the distance between the rich and the poor, the strong and the humble, increases rapidly. A little apart from this village, where all lived in apparent equality not long ago, the fortified house of the amghar and his brothers soon rises. Finally the external policy of the little state is also transformed and becomes more bellicose. The combative ardor
[578] of the opposed "ikhs," without employment within, finds in the
[613] leff quarrels the means of spending the surplus forces of the
[616] "taqbilt."

If general causes exert themselves at a distance to facilitate
[669] the development of despotic power, rising spontaneously in a canton, several small revolutions break out at the same time in various parts of the mountains. One soon sees a new regime of government established, which by degrees prevails. Such is the
[175] spectacle that was presented by the western Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/ twice in the last 50 years: first of all, in the middle of the nineteenth century, in the regions now subject to the great kaids, during the period that preceded and facilitated their domination; then, at the beginning of the twentieth century, in the parts of the mountains remaining free, when the political pressure of the masters of the casbahs of Bouaboud, Tagontaft, and Telwet on the republics of the high valleys was accentuated.

121 Having reached this point in our investigation, we must try
* 634 to see clearly the conditions under which the authority of the
178 amghars rises and develops, and what institutions -- precarious, without doubt, and imperfect like their power itself -- they substitute for the ones of the small republics that they have destroyed.

121 This research does not proceed without presenting numerous
* 634 difficulties. In order to carry it out, at the risk of losing the way
669 in the thousand details of Berbère /Berber/ life, and without fear

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175 *634 616 178 Subsequently, doubtless the intervention of the great kaids and later our presence distorted the simple working of the alliances, but still at present one sees the Aït arbaᶜin come down from the high mountains to the sons of the amghars of former times, who have now become kaids, and ask them for advice on the best way to fight against the neighboring "taqbilt" of the enemy leff. By utilizing the old Berbère /Berber/ institutions, these minor kaids easily get accepted at a distance a sort of protectorate over the fractions still free.

*634 •642 178 VII. The government of the canton by the amghar. -- Under the command of a victorious amghar, what becomes of the institutions of the Berbère /Berber/ republics whose purpose is to ensure perfect equality to all the families within the "taqbilt"?

When the new chief seizes authority, until then recognized solely in the council of the Aït arbaᶜin, the tradition that fixes the nature of the functions of the moqaddem fortunately comes to guide his first acts. In imitation of his predecessor, he passes himself off as the arbitrator of conflicts and applies himself, at least in appearance, to keeping the balance between rival "ikhs." Often he preserves the exterior forms of the oligarchic government of former times.

Thus we see the minor chief of the Seksawa, who has made his fortune thanks to the leff of the "Indghertit," El Hajj Hafid of the Idma, keep the moqaddems in his canton of origin. But he names them directly, without consulting the council, just as he chooses the Aït arbaᶜin among the families that are personally faithful to him. The meetings are held only in his house, and it is he who regulates the application of the customary law, in accord with the representatives of the "mouda" designated by him. The moqaddems become above all the agents of execution of his orders and he reserves for himself the political initiative and the right to decide on war.

The Intedan and Aït Mhand, two nearby "taqbilt," on whom El Hajj Hafid exerts his preponderant influence, have kept their

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*634 councils and magistrates. But among the first, only two person-
•642 ages, friends of the amghar, assume in turn the function of
178 moqaddem. Among the second, the Aït arbaᶜin, whose number has been reduced, and the moqaddem still exist, /282/ but they are no longer changed each year as ancient tradition requires.

Another amghar of the vicinity, Aqqai, who seized power among the Ichkajen, in the tribe of the Ida Ou Mhamoud, only a few years ago, suppressed the moqaddem in his command, but kept the Aït arbaᶜin, who have become his agents of execution and information. They collect for him the "ᶜachour" and the supplementary taxes with which he sends presents to his protector, the amghar Ahmed ou Moulid of the "taqbilt" of the Aït Haddiyous at the summit of the mountain of the Seksawa.

The nearby canton of the Aït Tounert, placed under the influence of the chief of the Aït Haddiyous, has kept, at least in appearance, the former government; but here the protective amghar must sanction the election of the moqaddem designated each year by the council. The Aït arbaᶜin themselves change frequently and are chosen by Ahmed ou Moulid, in agreement with the moqaddem (1).

1. Notes of F. de La Chapelle.

One sees in this way, by a rather slow transformation of the ancient Berbère /Berber/ organization, the oligarchic regime of the high valleys adapt itself little by little to the government of the independent amghars. The most powerful among these chiefs impose their protectorate over other, more recent amghars, who try, because of their very weakness, to treat the traditions with respect. The concern for preserving the strength of the bonds of alliance intact also spurs the protective amghar to respect the customs within his leff; above all, he avoids creating, by overly energetic action, the struggles of soffs that would bring about scissions.

[177] [616] When the power of chiefs develops in a region already subject to the influence of the Makhzen /makhzan/, where the

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/282 cont./ institution of councils of inflas and of moqaddems has already disappeared, the policy of the amghar is obviously simplified; it suffices for him to protect the minor sheiks who belong to his leff, without intervening within the cantons already used to despotic power. The amghar Mohammed of Tagontaft did this among the Aït Iraten, at the time when he had undertaken to drive the "Aït Atman" from the valley of the Nefis. The amghars of Talemt, chiefs of the leff of the "Aït Zolit," whose role on the south versant of the Atlas we have seen, /283/ also dominated, without doing away with them, the minor sheiks of Taberbourt, of the Aït Oumzal, and of the Onein, who were both their allies and their subjects. The feeling of leff solidarity here outweighed the personal ambition of the amghar, whose first desire is usually to increase his direct command in order to augment his resources. But all moderation disappears when the chief succeeds in conquering a canton of the adverse leff. He then puts at its head an amghar without local authority, to whom he entrusts a single mission: to watch over the collection of ceaselessly heavier taxes and to make the defeated enemies rapidly disappear.

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One would look in vain at this first stage of the amghar's power for an original feature in the organization of his command that could be regarded as the rough outline of a new political organization. This is because the authority of the new chief, which is still exercised in a very reduced domain, does not need intermediaries; in order to become strong, it borrows traditional forms all prepared and adapts with flexibility, as we have seen, to existing traditions.

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We scarcely see sometimes appearing near the amghar some war comrades, who have come from the outside and who form a kind of personal guard. Most often, however, his "ikhs" suffices for him to constitute this force; outsiders are often accepted with difficulty, their presence gives the amghar who surrounds himself with them too much the air of a gang leader, and the tribe would badly suffer their excesses.

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We are not acquainted with any amghar who has a prison. This is because in all circumstances the chief is still inspired,

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*634 [616] actively than elsewhere in order to produce the conflicts necessary for the development of his power. Hence a more apparent characteristic of violence even in the exercise of his power.

Also when the amghar disappears, victim of a rival's hate -- rarely from vengeance, for the worst abuses are endured with a surprising passivity -- his work perishes with him. When [178] Akherraz fell under the ax of the slave of a sheik of the Ida Ou Ziki 30 years ago, the republican regime was resuscitated at once, the "imzran" reappeared, and the annual circuit of justice was carried out anew with the customary ceremonial, faithfully preserved in all memories.

At other times, upon the chief's death, it happens that his sons lack authority; they are then deposed very simply, and they come /291/ to take only a modest place in the council of the Aït arbaʿin re-established with all its attributions. These sudden changes express the reaction of the masses quite well. Weary of [726] the dictatorship, which re-established internal order, but used up the country's forces in combats waged outside, the tribe rests for a time in anarchy, and soon the war of the soffs succeeds that of the cantons.

Nevertheless, it is not unparalleled that a compromise is established between the two opposed regimes and that the chief succeeds, thanks to his cleverness, in transmitting to his son a recognized and accepted authority. The Aït Oumghar of Tassedremt, among the Ifesfasen, thus succeeded in keeping power for three generations. They content themselves, it is true, [642] with collecting a third of the fines and presiding over the meeting of the notables; the annual circuit of justice begins and ends in their house; it seems, however, that the equilibrium thus established between the chief and the tribe is not durable and that the balance leans slowly but surely toward an oligarchic regime through the increase in the power of the most influential notables.

*634 642 The amghars of the Aït Tinkert, on the contrary, kept most of the prerogatives of despotic power. Doubtless they respect some of the ancient forms of the Berbère /Berber/ government; there still exists in each of the ten afous of their command a

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*634 .642 notable charged with representing his brothers. The tribal council even deliberates sometimes in public; but the decision has been prepared in the amghar's house and the tribe conforms to it exactly. The distribution of the profits of justice, of which the notables collect no more than a very small part, shows that all authority is concentrated in the hands of Bou Naga.

*634 *631 [642] But even in this case the concern for preserving the appearance of an assembly, whose presence itself is obligatory when the entire confederation reunites with Sidi Brahim Ou ᶜAli or at the souq /sook/ el Arbaᶜ of Imouzzer, suffices to show how, in spite of everything, personal power here remains limited by the recollection of the fundamental institutions of the country of the Ida Ou Tanan. If, by a marvel of continuity, the minor amghars of the Aït Tinkert have been able, thanks to family alliances, to the existence of a very powerful clan, to succeed in obtaining and keeping the command of the whole tribe for a century, they have at any rate remained locked within the natural cadre /292/ that this third of the great confederation formed. Even so, they are still subordinate to what the independent Berbères /Berbers/ call jokingly the "Makhzen of Sidi Brahim Ou ᶜAli." Thus, in [619] [671] spite of their power, they remain, like the left-chief amghars of the Seksawa, subject to the laws of the tribes (1).

1. For some years, the progress of the operation of the Makhzen /makhzan/ has manifested itself among the Ida Ou Tanan by a new development of personal power, thanks to the encouragement and external support given to the boldest clan chiefs. ᶜAli Ou Naser, amghar of the Aït Wanoukrim, Bihi ᶜAchao of Isk n Tghazout, and other party chiefs have subjugated by force the chiefs of the neighboring "afous." The artificial character of this movement has undoubtedly further accentuated the latent antagonism between the regime of the Aït arbaᶜin and that of the independent amghars.

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*631 131 XI. The minor chiefs of the oases of the South. -- One might be tempted to regard the minor chiefs of the desert oases that exist on the south versant of the Anti-Atlas, in the Moyen-Dra /Middle Dra/ and the Dadès, at the boundary of the country inhabited by the sedentary Berbères /Berbers/ of the mountains of the Sous, as amghars similar to the ones whose appearance and first successes we have just studied here.

*631 -642 It seems, however, that in this region other influences are being exerted, of a quite different nature, which favor the establishment and consolidation of that "despotic power" described so well by de Foucauld (2).

2. De Foucauld, Reconnaissance, pp. 111, 127, 128, 131, 145.

*631 *634 177 The social milieu, in fact, appears to be more propitious for the persistence of large families in the vicinity of the Sahara. Among the Zenaga, the Ida Ou Blal, the ʿAït Amer, the Mesgita, where small dynasties of amghars have been firmly established for long generations, Arab influences are numerous, and the hereditary transmission of command is one of the most constant characteristics of the social organization of the nomad groups (3).

3. G. Marçais, Les Arabes en Berbérie /The Arabs in Barbary/, pp. 704, 705.

613 554 675 Besides, there exist in these regions other institutions whose role easily explains the importance assumed by the heads of the "ikhs," powerful and brave: individual protection and vassalage. Near the desert the necessities of trade and travel in fact lead to the conclusion of pacts with notables capable of having the life and property of foreigners respected; these are true contracts, to which the name of "debiha" is given, and the power of a sheik is measured by the number of "debiha" that he possesses, whether he has accepted them directly or inherited them.

*631 /355 cont./
*634 obstinate resistance at least procured for the Aït Mhand ou Mousa
178 the preserving of their Aït Arbaᶜin and their moqaddems, accept-
616 ing only a liaison agent who plays the role of amghar.
726 The Tamarout fraction lost all its own institutions and has become similar, thanks to the action of the sheik Agzal, to its neighbors of the trail of the Makhzen /makhzan/. The Aït Breher, Aït Chaᶜib and Aït Tilet of the "Imsifern" leff resisted better. The first two of these "taqbilt" united closely to fight against the Mtougga's attempts at penetration. They restored the organization of moqaddems with more vigor than in the past. The
[671] customary law alone is applied in their territory, to the exclusion of the religious law; the moqaddems are changed regularly, and choosing them from overly powerful families is avoided for fear of seeing appear amghars whose first concern would be to favor the policy of the kaids. The Aït Chaᶜib showed themselves to be the indomitable adversaries of the caliphates of the Mtouggi for an especially long time and consented to submit only on the express condition of preserving a preferential regime. They pay Bouaboud only the ᶜachour and some "frida." The Aït Tilet, the most distant, have remained apart up to now, and the amghar of the Aït Haddiyous, Ahmed ou Moulid, counts them among the independent "taqbilt" of the summits, whose destinies he tries to guide.

*631 XIV. The zones of influence (the Seksawa). -- The Mtouggi's
*634 clever policy in the penetration of the Demsira is completed in the high mountains, as we have seen several times, by alliances that he concluded with the amghars of the Seksawa. In that region, where up to these recent years the intrigues coming out of the casbahs of Bouaboud and Tagontaft have crossed, one perceives more /356/ easily at present how the amghars most often prepare, without knowing it, the establishment of the domination of the great chiefs.

[178] The appearance of "despotic power" at the end of the nine-
[642] teenth century in the region remaining faithful on the whole to
[175] the regime of moqaddems and assemblies is not explained solely
[669] by the normal workings of oligarchic institutions; the frequency of

*631 /356 cont./
*634 minor revolutions taking place in the high valleys finds its cause
178 in the interest taken by the great kaids in the political transfor-
175 mation of the tribes.
642
669 The masters of the casbahs would actually not be able to enter into relations with the turbulent councils of Aït Arbaᶜin, always ready to question their orders and call on the friendship of the nearby republics in order to refuse to pay them the tax. Thus submission can only be contrived through the agency of personal power, which must be created first of all. From then on, the great kaids are seen to favor with all their means the notables capable of imposing their authority on assemblies too respectful of custom and attached to independence. In all circumstances
*631 we shall find these amghars disposed to treat with the great chiefs
*634 or the Makhzen /makhzan/ at the moment when conquest be-
178 comes inevitable. They will then present themselves as natural
648 intermediaries between the tribe that they have reduced and the power of the kaids who speak in the name of the Sultan. It is to their interest to handle carefully both the opposed sides and to facilitate the transformation of the country, which has become inevitable through the progress of the great chiefs. To succeed
*631 better in this, they themselves try to propagate, from canton to
*634 canton, the despotic regime that they have succeeded in install-
178 ing in their "taqbilt" (1).

1. It is in this way that in the high valleys of the Asif el Mal the amghars of the Aït Gair, ᶜAbderrahman Irro and his sons, were supported by the sheiks of the Ind Maghous, the Aït Jaᶜfar, most often devoted to the policy of the Gontafa. The Iwonsekten of the same leff underwent the same evolution under the same influence. The Imelwan also have amghars supported by the chief of the Aït Haddiyous of the Seksawa. The Aït Tiksit, of the "Imsifern" leff, rallied to the amghars of the Talekjont through the agency of their Tigouga neighbors, in turn got rid of their

/390 cont./

*631 Just as the sultan is in the hands of Allah, the kaids are the slaves
648 of the sovereign, and the subjects the humble servants of the kaids.
177 Moreover, there can exist in the Empire only one single State,
178 only a single Islamic community, of which the sherif is the
leader. The independent mountain republics are for the Makhzen
*634 only errors of corrupt men, creations that by strict right cannot
claim any law: nothingness engendered by ignorance.

Equally bent on destroying Berbérie /Barbary/, the temporal power of the chiefs and the divine right of the sultans are able to join and unite. Often, as we have said, it is the amghar, master
[616] of a leff established at the foot of the Dir, who enters the service
[619] of the Makhzen /makhzan/ of the plain; /391/ at other times it is a tribal chief in the mountains who receives the title of kaid; the lords of the Atlas themselves, whose conquests are made in the name of the sultan, govern according to the traditional principles of the sherifian State to the point where in our day it is into the parts of their territories remaining free of our control that one must go to observe the anachronism of the last tribes living under the regime of the Makhzen of former times.

Sometimes, it is true, these two powers of domination come to fight each other for a time, as we have seen in the country of the amghar of Tagontaft in the valley of the Nefis, but it is in order to unite better afterwards their wishes for exploitation and
• [642] their desires for conquest. The goal, often unconscious, of the
[185] efforts of the chiefs and of the sultan is to achieve on the ruins of the Berbère /Berber/ cantons the founding of an absolute Empire, without internal frontiers, subject to a single law and one that condemns the subjects to submit to a ruinous and pitiless tyranny.

It is difficult, when one measures the futility of the results obtained by the Makhzen and the amghars during ten centuries of fighting, to escape from a feeling of pity with regard to these people reduced to a servitude without ideals, in misery without hope, and who no longer look for any remedy for their ills other than an impotent and fleeting return to the anarchy of old. /Page 392 is blank./

2: Montagne--508 E-5 (c.1921-1928) 1930 MW11 Shluh MW11

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Conclusion
The Political Evolution of Sedentary Berbérie /Barbary/

I. The Berbère /Berber/ republics. -- II. The large commands of the Atlas. -- III. The Berbère /Berber/ kingdoms of North Africa. -- IV. Fragility of the power of the temporal leaders. -- V. The maraboutic States; their relative stability. -- VI. Consequences of the tribes' submission to the Makhzen. -- VII. The political future of Berbérie /Barbary/.

I. The Berbère /Berber/ republics. -- In the various regions of sedentary Berbérie /Barbary/, as we have seen in the course of this long study, the same social institutions rule the Masmouda, sequestered in the depths of the remote valleys of the Deren, the inhabitants of the market towns and hamlets that rise on the parched plateaus of the Anti-Atlas, the Jbala and the Riffians in their harsh mountains with peaks crowned with cedars, as well as the Kabyles of Algeria whose villages occupy the summits of the Djurjura like eagles' nests.

In all these regions, separated from one another by immense spaces, men live while obeying the same laws in spite of their diversity of origin and notwithstanding the variety of the conditions of material existence. That they have kept their millenary traditions they owe to the isolation of their territories. The present-day evidence of their institutions has a historic value; they give us the picture of what the Maghreb might have been if the Arab invasions in the East and the formation of the great Empires in the West had not ruined the minuscule states in which the Berbères /Berbers/ like to conceal their activity.

Two primordial tendencies determine the political life of the Berbères /Berbers/: in the first place they feel repugnance toward the constitution of a state of some size, they spontaneously organize themselves everywhere into small units whose dimensions do not exceed those of a mere /394/ canton and which are the veritable fatherland for the sedentary peoples; in the second place, by a kind of instinctive genius, the Berbères /Berbers/ form systems of balanced alliances that permit the small autonomous

/394 cont./

121 mountain states to aid one another in war and peace. Sometimes
171 these associations, to which the name of leffs is often given, are
*634 linked with the memory of the great struggles of the upper Middle
591 Ages between the autochthons and the invaders; sometimes they appear to us as venerable institutions whose origin is no longer known and which are closely bound up with the conditions of material existence and local traditions.

121 The political regime to which the Berbères /Berbers/ remain
171 attached with the most firmness, when they are living in inde-
*634 pendence, is thus a kind of organized anarchy; all the large
•642 families apply themselves then to maintaining, within the boundaries of a canton, a rigorous equality among them; it is under these circumstances that constitutions originate, democratic in appearance, oligarchic in fact, which have the purpose of regulating among all the notables the equitable sharing of the profits of power and of distributing among all the inhabitants the burdens of the common life. The Anti-Atlas, the Rif, the western Jbel, Kabylie /Kabylia/ before the conquest hardly knew, it seems, any other institutions in the course of history; the Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/ itself, which has seen such surprising political transformations for two generations, was still found in the middle of the past century divided into small republics similar to those of the Djurjura at the time of its independence.

121 When the tribes preserve their traditional political organiza-
171 tion, one barely sees arise, under identical aspects in these di-
619 verse regions of sedentary Berbérie /Barbary/, a precarious per-
*634 sonal power limited to the narrow frontiers of one tribal fraction
578 in the cadre of one valley. The petty tyrannies that then form are so fragile that the chiefs, emerging from the struggle of the soffs within villages, barely masters of a minuscule territory, are most often carried off without return by a change in the equilibrium of the parties in the interval of one or two generations.

121 One region alone forms an exception to this extreme in-
171 stability of the power of the amghars, who are usually only the
*631 ephemeral masters of the little mountain cantons. The Sous at
*634 the end of the nineteenth century, and more particularly the part